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I. INTRODUCTION
t is generally understood that the recent revolutions in Eastern
Europe are producing a large-scale “transition.” It is important,
however, to distinguish among the quite different features of the
current changes. The new reform movements actually involve three
distinctive transitions. The first is a transition from a command
economy to markets. The second is a transition from a system of
one-party domination to democracy. The third is a transition from a
system in which government is unconstrained by laws laid down in
advance to constitutionalism and the rule of law.
Although important work is occurring on all these fronts, participants in current debates generally assume that the three transitions are not closely connected. At the present. and for the foreseeable future, it seem; clear that the transition to markets, and the accompanying efforts to promote economic development, will be
foremost in the minds of the reformers. Democratization appears
also on the agenda, but it is taking a secondary role. In the meantime, the movement for constitutional reform generally draws little
public attention, and indeed has been dwarfed by other matters. In
many circles, the drafting of the Constitution is thought to involve
symbolic or even irrelevant matters having no real connection to the
hard pragmatic work of economic and political reform.
I believe that the separation of the three transitions, and the devaluation of constitution-writing, are extremely unfortunate and
potentially dangerous mistakes. In fact the transitions are closely re-
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lated. The right kind of constitution could play a crucial role in fueling economic development and democratic reform; indeed, it may be
indispensable to them. The wrong kind of constitution-or no
constitution at all-could be devastating to both of these.
To offer only one example: Firm constitutional Protection of
property rights, combined with an independent judiciary is an excellent way of encouraging international investment in one’s nation.
Such devices should spur domestic investment and initiative as well.
Without such constitutional protection, there will be a serious obstacle to the necessary economic activity from international and domestic enterprises. Anyone who engages in these activities will do so
with knowledge that the state may take their property or abrogate
their contracts. To say the very least, this will be an obstacle to economic development.
In Eastern Europe, there is a far more pressing need for constitutional protection of economic and democratic rights than there
was in the United States or the West. In the United States, for example, the process of constitution-making was much simplified by
virtue of the fact that well before that process began, private property, the common law, and civil society were firmly in place. The
constitution-makers could build on, and attempt to protect, existing
achievements. The market and the institutions of civil society-private intermediate associations operating between the individual and
the state, including religious organizations, charitable trusts, local
community groups, business enterprises-antedated the Constitution.
The task of constitution-making in Eastern Europe is both
more critical and more daunting, precisely because of the absence of
well-established institutions protecting market ordering and civil
society. The emerging constitutions must not only create the basic
governmental structures and protect the conventional catalog of
liberal rights, but also concern themselves with the creation of safeguards for the transition to (some version of) market ordering. If
they fail to do so, a large amount of the important work will occur
on the legislative front, where there may be special barriers to success. A particular problem is that democratic politics may make it
difficult to create real markets, which produce such transitional
problems as inflation and unemployment. Even more fundamentally, the process of constitution-making could become irrelevant to
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many of the fundamental issues now facing Eastern Europe. There
is a serious current danger that the moment of constitutional opportunity will be irretrievably lost; and if it is, both prosperity and democratization will be at risk
This essay comes in three parts. The first briefly discusses the relationships among property, democracy, and economic growth. My
principal goal is to show that property should be seen as a political
right, one that reduces dependence on the state and creates the kind
of security that is indispensable to genuine citizenship in a democracy. Property rights are not in conflict with democracy; in a variety
of ways they help provide the preconditions for self-governance.
The creation of private property also serves a number of functions
indispensable to economic development.
The second part speculates about the contents of a constitution
that is self-consciously designed, as Western constitutions have not
entirely been, to create a market economy and to promote the institutions of civil society. My particular goal here is to argue that constitutionalism can play a crucial role in protecting both economic development and democratic self-government. A well-drafted constitution can guard against a system in which ownership rights are effectively subject to continuous political revision; such a system reintroduces all of the problems, both economic and democratic, introduced by common ownership of property. Through cataloguing
possible provisions, I hope to begin a process of helping to develop a
kind of “economic bill of rights” for constitution-making in Eastern
Europe. Such a development might ultimately count as one of a
range of contributions of the recent events to the theory and practice of constitutionalism, and to the long-overdue integration of
economics and constitutionalism.
The third part deals with two problems that cannot be solved
through constitution-making. The first problem is that of interpretation. The meaning of any text is a function of interpretive principles, and these cannot be spelled out in the text itself. The second
problem is the task of initially allocating entitlements. That task
must be undertaken through ordinary legislation, and it will have a
range of surprising effects.
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I. PROPERTY, PROSPERITY, DEMOCRACY
We should begin by distinguishing between two sorts of constitutions. Westerners often think that Soviet-style constitutions are
not constitutions at all. In fact, however, they embody a distinct
conception of constitutionalism. Crucially, such constitutions do not
distinguish between public and private spheres. They apply their
prohibitions and permissions to everyone.
Moreover, such constitutions contain duties as well as rights.
They do not merely grant privileges to citizens, but also impose obligations on them. Finally, and most important of all, the central
provisions of Soviet-style constitutions set out very general social
aspirations or commitments. Their provisions are designed to state
those aspirations, not to create concrete entitlements that citizens
can attempt to vindicate, through an independent judiciary, against
government officials. These aspirations include a wide range of
“positive” rights.
Thus, for example, the Soviet Constitution includes the right to
work (Art. 4O), the right to rest and leisure (Art. 41), the right to
health protection (Art. 42), and the right to maintenance in old age,
sickness, and disability (Art. 43). It imposes on citizens the duty to
“preserve and protect socialist property” and to “enhance the power
and prestige” of the Soviet State (Art. 62). The Polish Constitution
includes the right to work (Art. 68), the right to rest and leisure
(Art. 69), and the right to health protection (Art. 70). The Romanian Constitution includes the right to leisure (Art. 19), the right to
work, including equal pay for equal work and measures for the protection and safety of workers (Art. 18); the Bulgarian Constitution
offers the right to a holiday (Art. 42), the right to work (Art. 40),
the right to labor safety (Art. 41), the right to social security (Art.
43), and the right to free medical care (Art. 47).
Along each of these dimensions, Western constitutions are quite
different. The provisions of such constitutions generally apply only
to the government, and not to private actors. They do not impose
duties. Most important, they aim to create solid individual rights,
ones that can be invoked by individual citizens, as of right, in an independent tribunal authorized to bar governmental action. Western
constitutions generally do not include broad aspirations.
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The individual rights protected by Western constitutions are
not, of course, limited to private property and economic liberties.
They include other political and civil liberties and rights as well, and
these are indispensable safeguards. My principal goal here, however,
is to understand how constitutionalism might work simultaneously
to promote the transition to economic markets and the transition to
democracy, and for this reason it will be valuable to focus on the
right to private property. In this section, I briefly outline some of the
functions served by that right. The basic story should be familiar. I
recount it here because it seems especially important to keep it in
mind while exploring the recent wave of constitution-making in
Eastern Europe.
A. Private Property and Economic Prosperity

It is generally agreed that a system of private property helps to
bring about economic prosperity. There are at least four central reasons.’
First, the institution of private property2 creates and takes advantage of the powerful human inclination to bring goods and services
to oneself and to people one cares about.3 This claim does not depend on a proposition about human selfishness. The desire to acquire goods might be deeply altruistic, in the sense that people may
want to give their goods to others, including the most vulnerable.
In a system of private property, the gains from the use and cultivation of ownership rights accrue to a designated owner. A system
without private property stifles incentives and thus induces both
l I draw in this section on J. Waldron, The Right to Private Property
.
2 As a technical matter, a system of private property should not be identified with a market economy. The distinguishing feature of a market economy is
free alienability of ownership rights. The distinctive feature of a system of private property is that individuals are entitled to decide how resources will be
used. See J. Waldron, supra note 1, at 60. In practice, however, these closely
related ideas tend to go hand-in-hand.
3 Aristotle made the basic point: “Men pay most attention to what is their
own: they care less for what is common; or, at any rate, they care for it only to
the extent to which each is individually concerned.” See Aristotle, Politics,
1261 (p. 44) (trans. Barker).

(1988).
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sloth and waste.4 These points, too, do not depend. on especially
cynical accounts of human nature. It is necessary only to glance
briefly at history, past and present, and to acknowledge that human
beings will frequently attempt to accumulate resources. Social institutions appealing to this inclination will increase social productivity.
Second, a system of private property performs a crucial coordinating function. It ensures that the multiple desires of hundreds,
thousands, or millions of consumers will be reflected in market outcomes. In this way it protects against the perverse forms of scarcity
produced by a command economy. Public officials cannot possibly
know what and how much people will want in advance. Their decisions will thus create both too much and too little production. By
contrast, a system of ownership rights signals people to devote their
productive activity to places in which that activity is most valued. A
command-and-control economy is far inferior in this regard. Every
citizen of Eastern Europe has seen multiple illustrations.
Third, the institution of private property solves, all at once, a serious collective action problem faced by people in any system without
that institution.5 When property is unowned, no one has a sufficient
incentive to use it to its full advantage or to protect it against
exploitation. The creation of private property overcomes this problem. It ensures that externalities from use will be internalized by
people who are producing either social harms or social benefits.6
The point can be made more vivid by a glance at the problem of
environmental deterioration. In recent years, it has been increasingly
recognized that that problem-especially severe in Eastern Europe
4 This is a claim about the likely facts, not a necessary truth. Powerful social norms may operate as a surrogate for private property, helping to overcome
some of the problems discussed in text. Cf. Ullmann-Margalit, The Emcrgence of Norms (1978).
5 The point is elaborated in Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, Am. Econ. Rev.: Proceedings and Papers 57 (1967).
6 The text uses a pre-Coasian understanding of both harms and benefits,
see Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1960); that is, it
assumes that we can know without much reflection what sorts of things are
“costs”of what sorts of activities. As Coase would have it, costs should be seen
as relational entities produced by acts and omissions by many people and not
clearly attributable to any one of them. An understanding that something is a
cost of something else looks like a descriptive proposition, but it must a&ally
be justified on moral grounds.
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but of critical importance in the West as well-is in significant part7
a product of the collective action problem produced by the fact that
the air and water are public goods, that is, collectively rather than
privately owned.* The consequence is that the environmental costs
of polluting activity are widely diffused among the public and not
“internalized,” or taken into account, by polluters. Because they do
not bear the direct cost, polluters lack an incentive to limit their
polluting activity. This system creates a built-in tendency toward excessive pollution levels.
A system without private property can be understood as a massive
version of this unfortunate state of affairs. If property is unowned,
everyone has an incentive to exploit it, and no one has an incentive
to use it to its full advantage. Activity levels will have no relationship
to their actual social costs and benefits.9 Ownership rights overcome
the difficulty. They operate like a well-functioning system of environmental law; they ensure that people have incentives to take account of both the benefits and the harms of what they do. This is
an exceedingly important task for a constitutional democracy.
Finally, a system of private property creates the kind of stability
and protection of expectations that are preconditions for investment
and initiative, from both international and domestic sources. A
company deciding whether to invest in a country will have a greater
incentive to do so if it knows that its investment will be protected,
and that government confiscation is prohibited by the government’s
basic law. A citizen who is seeking to begin a business will be far
more likely to do so if he can operate against a secure and stable
background, protected against the vicissitudes of government policy.
In this way, too, economic development can be facilitated by property rights.
7 This is not, of course, the only possible understanding of the environmental problem. There are other, noneconomic reasons to think that the level
of pollution is too high. See S. Kelman, What Price Incentives? (1982).
* Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243 (1968).
9 I do not mean to endorse here the economic conception of costs and
benefits, which is based on private willingness to pay and which will be unacceptable for many purposes. On any valuation, however, a system of collective
ownership threatens to create the dangers mentioned in the text.
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B. Property and Democracy

The connection between property and prosperity may be reasonably well understood; but the right to private property has not always
been considered a precondition for democracy. On the contrary, private property has frequently been thought an obstacle to democracy,
and for this reason highly objectionable, or perhaps at best an institution necessary for economic growth and therefore to be reluctantly
accepted, despite its corrosive effects on the democratic process.10
There is indeed some tension between a system of property
rights and a system of democracy. If property rights are secure, there
is a firm limit on what the democratic process is entitled to do. In
this sense the tension is a real and enduring one. Notably, markets
impose conspicuous short-term cost+--unemployment and inflation-and in the emerging Eastern European democracies, there
will probably be. a continuous temptation to slow down the transition to markets or perhaps to reject the transition altogether. For
this reason the simultaneous transition to democracy and to economic markets-without the protection of constitutionalism-will
be exceptionally difficult.
In important respects, however, it is quite plausible to think that
the right to a stable system of property rights-one with which the
state will interfere only occasionally or in a limited way, with a provision for compensation - i s actually necessary. to democracy and not
opposed to it at all.
The most fundamental point about the relationship between
property and democracy is that a right to own private property has
an important and salutary effect on the citizens’ relationship with
the state and-equally important- o n their understanding of that
relationship. Because of this effect, it can be seen as a necessary precondition for the status of citizenship. Personal security and personal
independence from the government are guaranteed in a system in
which rights of ownership are protected through public institutions.
This theme has played a large role in republican thought. On
the republican view, the status of citizen implies a measure of indelo I do not deal here with the relationship between individual development
and property rights, though I believe that property rights do in fact promote
that goal. For a good discussion, see J. Waldron, supra note 1, ch. 10.
l1 And long-term ones as well.
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pendence from government power. This view was often associated
- a s , for example, in the notion that
with exclusionary practices
people without property should not be allowed to vote. One may
deplore the exclusion without rejecting the proposition that a
democratic state should attempt to give citizens a sense of independence from the state itself. In fact the republican tradition, read in
light of modern understandings, argues not for an abolition of private property but instead for a system attempting to ensure that everyone has some.
In this sense, the ownership of private property is closely associated with the rule of law.12 Both of these create a realm of private
autonomy in which the citizenry can operate without fear of public
intrusion. That realm is indispensable to the public sphere itself.
Only people with a degree of security from the state are able to participate without fear, and with independence, in democratic deliberations. In this sense, a sharp, legally-produced distinction between
the private and the public can usefully serve the public sphere. Contrary to a conventional understanding, it need not harm it at all.13
Even more fundamentally: The division between private and
public spheres is hard to defend or even to understand if it is treated
as a metaphysical one, or as a claim that public power is not behind
the private sphere. But if we understand the division as a political
one, to be justified in public terms, it becomes both intelligible and
indispensable. The (legal) creation of a private sphere, undertaken by
the state, is a key part of the process of creating civil society and
market ordering. If these can be justified, the private sphere itself becomes unproblematic, at least in the abstract. Of course its particular
l2 F. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (1948). Initially Hayek’s discussion of
this point seems exceptionally confusing. He identifies markets and property
on the one hand with the rule of law on the other; but the rule of law seems to
imply, not necessarily markets and property, but instead firm constraints on
official discretion and institutions to enforce those constraints. Such constraints can be created with or without property, that is, a command economy
can set down clear rules in advance. (Consider some of the American law of
environmental protection, which relies on command-and-control methods, but
which usually does not delegate open-ended authority to bureaucrats.) But the
identification seems more plausible in light of the considerations discussed in
the text.
l3 Cf. Holmes, Gag Rules and Democracy, in Constitutionalism and
Democracy (J. Elster &A. Hylland eds. 1988).
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content can always be criticized, and is frequently subject to democratic redefinition.
The creation of private property can also be connected with the
traditional proscription on punishment by reference to vague laws or
punishment without laws at all.14 That proscription is designed to
provide the citizenry with a wall of personal security, creating zones
of freedom in which people can operate without fear. A system of
private property performs closely related functions.
A central point here is that in a state in which private property
does not exist, citizens are dependent on the good will of government officials, almost on a daily basis.15 Whatever they have is a
privilege and not a right. They come to the state as supplicants or
beggars, rather than as rightholders. Any challenge to the state may
be stifled or driven underground by virtue of the fact that serious
challenges could result in the withdrawal of the goods that give
people basic security. A right to private property, free from government interference, is in this sense a necessary basis for a democracy.
In American law, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine operates as a response to this concern in the context of funding, licensing, and employment. 16 The government may not use its power to
grant (say) welfare benefits as a way to pressure the exercise of free
speech rights. In fact, the creation of property rights should be seen
as an unconstitutional conditions doctrine writ very large. The idea
is that government may not use its power over property to pressure
rights generates a strong
rights in general; the existence of prop
barrier against this form of pressure. just as the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine provides a degree of insulation in narrower settings.
There is a more particular sense in which private property helps
to promote resistance to government. If government owns the
presses, or the means of distribution, freedom of speech cannot easily

erty

l4 See the classic discussion in L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (1964).
l5 The demoralizing effects of such regimes are well known to citizens of
Communist nations, and indeed to visitors-as well. Continuous dependence on
government officials has a range of predictable corrosive effects on both character and spirit-a worthy subject for inquiry by a modern Tocqueville.
l6 See generally Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L.
Rev. 1413 (1989); Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the
Limits of Content, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1988).
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exist. Indeed, if government owns the paper itself, or allocates it in
its discretion, there will be serious problems for the system of free
expression. More generally, private ownership facilitates the kind of
security on which diversity and pluralism depend. Political censorship may be altogether unnecessary if it is understood that current
holdings are vulnerable to state control.
The final point is that one of the best ways to destroy a democratic system is to ensure that the distribution of wealth and resources is unstable and constantly up for new evaluation by the political process. A high degree of stability is necessary in order to allow
people to plan their affairs, to reduce the effects of factional or interest-group power in government, to promote investment, and to
prevent the political process from breaking down by attempting to
resolve enormous, emotionally laden issues about who is entitled to
what. Stability and security-a sense of context-are important individual and collective goods. A system in which property rights are
open to continuous readjustment will produce serious harm.17
In addition, government control of property-through constant
readjustment of ownership rights-simply reintroduces the collective
action problem originally solved by property rights. Public choice
theory can be seen in part as a generalization of this simple insight.
Like the right to freedom of religious conscience,18 moreover,
the right to property helps create a flourishing civil society, an intermediate level between the government and the individual. The
development of a civil society can in turn be understood as a mechanism both for creating economic prosperity and for promoting
democratic self-governance. A constitutional system that respects
private property should be regarded, not as an effort to oppose liberal
rights to collective self-government, but instead as a way to fortify
democratic processes.
I have not dealt with the question of redistribution. In the
West, enthusiasm for property rights is often thought to entail a reluctance’ to allow redistribution, or (worse) complete indifference to
the poor. The proper response is twofold; First, property rights help
create wealth, and greater wealth will often benefit the most vulnerI7 For this reason the embrace of “context-smashing” in R. Unger, Politics

(1985), seems’ most puzzling.
l8 Cf. Holmes, supra note 13.
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able as well. Time and again it has been shown that economic
growth does more than welfare and employment programs to benefit the disadvantaged. Of course growth does not do everything,
and it must be supplemented. The second point, then, is that welfare and employment programs are a necessary part of any system of
property rights. Such rights are best defended in self-consciously
instrumental terms, because of the good things that they do. When
they do not accomplish good, or enough good, they must be accompanied by other social strategies.
Properly understood, the defense of property rights is a defense
of programs of redistribution as well. These programs are not designed to produce economic equality-a truly disastrous goal-but
instead to bring about genuine equality of opportunity and, equally
important, freedom, for all people in society, from desperate conditions, or from circumstances that impede human functioning.19
II. PROPERTY AND CONSTITUTION-MAKING
I have said that the task of economic development cannot be
rigidly separated from the task of constitution making. Without
constitutional protection of property rights, there will be continuous
pressure to adjust distributions of property on an ad hoc basis. When
a group of people have acquired a good deal of money, it will be
tempting to tax them heavily. When another group has verged on
bankruptcy, there will be a temptation to subsidize them. After the
fact, these steps may seem fair or even necessary; but if everyone
knows that government might respond in this way, there will be a
powerful deterrent to the creation of a market economy. No citizen- a n d no international or domestic investor-can be secure of
his immunity from the state.
A pervasive risk is that governmental control over property rights
will undo the decision, made in the basic system creating such
rights, to solve a collective action problem faced-by public ownership.
If property rights are insecure-if they are subject to continuous
governmental examination- t h e system will approach equivalence to
one in which there are no such rights at all. This will introduce all
l9 See Nussbaum, Aristotelian Social Democracy, in Liberalism and the
Good (R. Douglass, G. Mara, & H. Richardson, eds., 1990); A. Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (1985).
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of the problems, described in Part I, to which a system of property
rights is supposed to respond. Above all, it will create individual vulnerability to government and at the same time produce both too little and too much use of existing resources. It will deter economic development and impair the movement toward democracy as well.
A. In General

I have claimed that a constitution can accomplish a great deal in
easing the transition to economic markets and private property. In
order for it to do so, constitutional protections must be judicially
enforceable-that is, a court must be available to vindicate any rights
that the constitution creates. Ordinary citizens must have a general
right to raise constitutional objections before an independent tribunal authorized to provide redress. Without judicial review, constitutions tend to be worth little more than the paper on which they
are written. They become simple words, or public relations documents, rather than instruments that confer genuine rights. While
the efficacy of courts in social reform is disputable,20 there can be
little doubt that judicially enforceable constitutions can have a significant effect both on real-world results and on legal and social
culture in general. 21 To be sure, some nations in the West have
prospered with little or nothing in the way of judicial enforcement
of constitutions. But these nations were able to benefit from the
background of civil society, market economies, and well-defined
property rights. For them, constitutional protections were far less
important.
AFor Eastern Europe in general, the drafting of the constitution
appears to pose two especially distinctive challenges. The first is to
begin the process of creating a legal culture with firm judicial protection of individual rights. By individual rights, I mean, first and
foremost, traditional “negative” rights against government, prominent among them private property and freedom of contract. It is of
course misleading to think of these as genuinely negative rights.
They depend for their existence on governmental institutions will2o See G Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope (1991)
z Mucd of the effect is deterrence of harmful governmental action before
the fact, rather than governmental losses in actual litigated cases. The fear of
losing in court has often proved a substantial deterrent to government.
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ing to recognize, create, and protect them. But this point is a semantic one; the defense of the traditional rights need not depend on
the false claim that they are negative.
The second challenge is to facilitate the creation of a market
economy and of a civil society-that is, a realm of private action
containing institutions (churches, markets, corporations, labor
unions, women’s organizations, and so forth) that are independent
of the state and constrained minimally by it. Through meeting these
challenges, a constitution could simultaneously promote democratic
goals and help bring about economic prosperity.
To carry out this task, constitution-makers should avoid three
strategies that contain serious risks. All of these strategies are characteristic features of communist constitutionalism. Unfortunately, all
of them appear to be influencing current debates in the post-communist era. The draft Constitutions tend to replicate the errors of
the communist constitutions themselves.22
1. Aspirations. The first such strategy is to use a constitution as a
place for setting out very general social aspirations, or for imposing
positive duties on government (such as the provision of a social welfare state including such guarantees as equitable remuneration,
leisure time, social security, and occupational safety and health).
There are three reasons why this would be a dangerous strategy, at
least under current conditions.
First, to state aspirations and impose positive duties-prominent
of course in the Soviet Constitution-runs the risk of turning a
constitution into something other than a legal document with realworld consequences. It is important to remember that if it is to create rights realistically enforceable in the world, a constitution should
not list all things to which a country aspires. It should limit itself,
for the most part, to rights that it is genuinely able to enforce. A
constitution that creates positive rights is not likely to be subject to
judicial enforcement, because these rights are vaguely defined, simultaneously involve the interests of numerous people, and depend for
their existence on active management of government institutionssomething for which judges are ill-suited. The existence of unen22 These draft Constitutions are on file with the Center on Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, University of Chicago Law School, and can be
obtained from that Center.
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forceable rights will in turn tend to destroy the negative rightsfreedom of speech, freedom of religion, and so forth-that might
otherwise be genuine ones. If some rights are shown to be unenforceable, it is likely that other rights will be unenforceable as well.
The second problem with positive rights is that they will work
against the general current efforts to diminish the sense of entitlement to state protection, and to encourage individual initiative and
self-reliance. Both markets and democracy tend to develop these
highly salutary characteristics. Sometimes liberal constitutionalism is
praised because it responds accurately to “human nature,” and does
not try to tinker with it. There is undoubtedly something to this
idea; efforts fundamentally to revise human character are usually
doomed to failure. But liberal constitutionalism might be defended
precisely on the ground that it has healthy effects on human character. Markets and democracy tend to create certain types, with many
valuable characteris tics.23
To say this is emphatically not to say that in the post-reform era,
nations in Eastern Europe should eliminate social welfare protections and leave their citizens to the vicissitudes of the market. Such a
route would be a recipe for disaster, since it would allow for mass
suffering of the kind that is unacceptable in any nation. But these
protections should be created at the level of ordinary legislation, and
subject to democratic discussion, rather than placed in the foundational document.
The third problem with positive rights is that they establish
government interference with markets as a constitutional duty. The
current effort is to limit such interference, and to establish the preconditions for private markets, free trade, and free contract. To impose a constitutional duty of interference is to move in precisely the
wrong direction.
2. Duties. Another strategy, posing similar risks, is to use the
constitution as a place for creating “duties” as well as rights. Such
duties are not likely to be enforceable through courts. Their statement in a constitution tends to weaken the understanding that the
document creates protected rights, with real meaning, against the
23 See J Mill Considerations on Representative Government, ed. C.V.
Shields (1881: Niw York: Liberal. Arts Press, 1958). To say this is not of
course to say that all of those characteristics are always good ones.
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state. Moreover, countries in Eastern Europe are attempting to
eliminate the effects of the notion that the state imposes “duties” on
citizens, rather than giving them rights. It may be that in the West,
more emphasis on duties would be a good idea. Perhaps the Western
emphasis on “rights” has harmed social deliberation, especially in the
United States, where duties should be taken more seriously.24 But
this is the direction from which Eastern Europe ought to be
emerging.
3. No distinction between public and private spheres. Yet another
dangerous strategy is to make constitutional provisions binding
against private people and private organizations as well as against the
state. In almost all Western systems, the constitution applies only to
the government, not to the people in general. This is extremely important, because it recognizes and helps create a private sphere--a
civil society that operates independently of the state. It also frees up
private organizations-employers, religious organizations, unions,
and so forth-to act as they choose. If the people want to apply particular constitutional provisions to particular private organizations, of
course they can do so, through ordinary legislation. But it is a mistake to apply such provisions through the constitution itself. Above
all, this strategy works to erase the distinction between the private
and public spheres, in a way that would tend to defeat current aspirations in Eastern Europe. As noted, that distinction should be enthusiastically embraced on substantive political grounds.
Ironically, these dangers are more serious for the East than for
the West. In the United States, for example, the institutions of private property and civil society are firmly in place, and social injustice
frequently occurs precisely because of the absence of positive protections and of safeguards against the power of private institutions. The
case for a firm right to some forms of social assistance is at least a
plausible one in America. Such a right would not seriously jeopardize
existing legal and social institutions; it could not possibly threaten
the general belief in markets, solid property rights, and civil society.
In systems that are seeking for the first time to establish free
markets and civil society, and that already have a strong public
commitment to a social welfare state, the relevant considerations
point in precisely the opposite direction. A dramatic legal and cul24 See M. Glendon, Rights Talk (1991).
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tural shift, creating a belief in private property and a respect for markets, is indispensable. It is therefore surprising but true that the case
for a strongly negative constitution, protecting market arrangements, is under current conditions powerful in Eastern Europe,
even if it is ambiguous in the West.
We might draw a more general conclusion from this discussion.
It is often said that constitutions, as a form of higher law, must be
compatible with the culture and mores of those whom they regulate.
In one sense, however, the opposite is true. Constitutional provisions should be designed to work against precisely those aspects of a
country’s culture and tradition that are likely to produce harm
through that country’s ordinary political processes. There is a large
difference between the risks of harm faced by a nation committed by
culture and history to free markets, and the-corresponding risks in a
nation committed by culture and history to social security and general state protection. Constitutions should work against the particular nation’s most threatening tendencies. This point explains why
extremely powerful safeguards against sex discrimination and ethnic
and religious oppression are necessary in Eastern Europe (a point
that would, however, take me well beyond the scope of this essay). It
is above all for this reason that constitutions designed for one nation
are ill-adapted for others.
B. Particdar Provisions

In the next few years, it will be critical to develop a set of potential provisions for inclusion as an “economic bill of rights” section of
the proposed constitution. Indeed, this section could serve as one of
the many possible new contributions of current constitution-makers
to the general theory and practice of constitutionalism.
I provide in this section a preliminary outline of constitutional
provisions that might be adopted in the interest of creating a wellfunctioning system of property rights and economic markets. The
outline amounts to little more a list; it is intended only to provide a
starting point for discussion.
1. The rule of Zaw. In order to comply with the rule of law, a
government must ensure that action may not be taken against citizens unless it has laid down, in advance, a pertinent law. The rule of
law requires that any such restriction must be clear rather than vague
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and publicly available rather than secret; and it must operate in the
world as it does on the books.25
A guarantee of the rule of law is both an economic and a democratic right. It creates a wall of protection around citizens, giving a
guarantee of immunity and ensuring them that they may engage in
productive activity without fear of the state. And by creating this
wall of protection, the guarantee creates the kind of security and independence that are prerequisites for the role of a citizen in a
democracy.
2. Protection of property against takings without compensation.

Many constitutions contain protection of this kind. The American
Constitution embodies this idea in the fifth amendment, which
says, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.“2 6 A provision of this general sort is indispensable on
both economic and democratic grounds. Without such a provision,
there is not, in fact or in law, a system of private property.
3. Protection of property against takings without due process. This
is a procedural rather than substantive protection of property. It
means that citizens will be provided with a hearing before government may interfere with their holdings. A provision of this sort accomplishes two functions.
First, it promotes accurate factfinding. A hearing before an independent tribunal ensures that property will not be taken capriciously, or on the basis of whim, or for discriminatory or irrelevant
reasons. In the hearing, it is necessary to show the facts that would
justify a deprivation of property as a matter of law. Second, the
hearing right carries out an important dignitary and participatory
function. To say that people cannot be deprived of property without
a hearing is to say that before it acts against them, the government
must listen to what they have to say. This constraint improves governmental legitimacy as well. There is considerable evidence that
people feel more secure and trustful if government affords them an
opportunity to be heard before it undertakes action harmful to their
interests.
25 See L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (1964).
26 U.S. Const. Amend V.
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4. Protection of contracts.
(a) In generai Many constitutions protect contractual liberty

from governmental invasion-as in, for example, a provision to the
effect that government shall not pass any “Law impairing the Obligations of Contracts.” 2 7 Constitutional protection of contracts
ensures citizens that when they engage in economic arrangements,
they can do so free from the spectre of governmental interventions.
Without this right, there will be a serious deterrent to productive
activity.
For those countries that choose this route, there are two central
questions. The first is whether the protection applies prospectively,
or only retroactively. One might think that the state should be free
to create the background against which people enter into agreements, and that therefore there should be no limit on the state’s
power to set out, in advance, limits on the terms on which people
may contract. This is the approach taken in American law, which
allows the government to affect contractual ordering however it
wishes, so long as it does so in advance.
The second and related question is the extent of the “police
power,” pursuant to which limits on contractual freedom will be
permitted. It is obvious that the state can forbid contracts for murder
or assault. It will probably be agreed that the state may forbid contracts to work for less than a certain monthly wage, or for more
than a certain number of hours per week. But does this mean that a
state can impair a contract retroactively simply because it believes
that the outcome is unfair to one side?28 If so, freedom of contract
becomes a dead letter.
(b) Ban on wage andprice controls. Limits on wages and pricesin the form of floors or ceilings-are of course a standard method
27 Art. 1, section 9, section 10.
28 Sometimes people think that the appropriate remedy for a harsh bargain
is to disallow the bargain. But it is not at all clear that this remedy helps the
weaker side. Usually someone in bad circumstances will be presented with a
range of unfavorable alternatives, and will choose the least unfavorable of them.
To disallow this option does nothing to improve the bad circumstances, and
simply forces the person to choose the second-least unfavorable option. It is
crucially important for the emerging democracies to understand this point. Efforts to close off market options are tempting when those options seem few and
produce harsh results; but the closing off is an utterly ineffectual remedy.
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for interfering with free markets. There is for this reason a plausible
argument that Eastern European countries should commit themselves, in advance, to a decision not to take this course, which is often appealing in the short-run but extremely destructive for the future.
A particular problem here is that well-organized private groups
will frequently seek assistance, in the form of regulatory laws enabling them to function as a cartel. This strategy might at first
glance have a public interest justification, but it can ultimately be
disastrous. A system that creates minimum prices for (say) milk may
help some milk producers, but it will also create scarcity in an important commodity and also increase prices for consumers, many of
them likely to be poor. Maximum prices can in turn produce scarcity,
often of important commodities.
A system in which government generally sets minimum and
maximum prices will eventually produce many of the economic and
democratic problems that Eastern European nations are attempting
to solve. The United States has witnessed this very problem with
regulation of energy prices; such regulation helped produce the energy crisis of the 1970s.
On the other hand, it is also plausible to think that controls on
wages and prices will sometimes be desirable during and after the
transition to a market economy. Even in such an economy, legal
controls on wages and prices sometimes have at least plausible justifications. The category is not limited to the minimum wage; it includes price supports of various kinds as well. A ban on wage and
price controls may be excessively strong medicine for the problem at
hand.
5. Occupational Ziberty. There are several possible provisions for
protecting occupational liberty.
(a) Protection offlee entry into occupations, trades, and business. A
provision of this sort can be found in the German Constitution.
This is a salutary protection against governmental restrictions on an
important form of liberty, one that is part and parcel of free labor
markets.
It does, however, contain an ambiguity, similar to that arising
under the protection of freedom of contract. It seems clear that
government can impose certain limits requiring that jobs be performed by people who are trained to do them. It can, for example,
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ensure that doctors actually know something about medicine, or
that lawyers are trained in the law. If this is so, it will be necessary to
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate interferences with
free entry into occupations, rather than simply to say that the
government has no role to play in this regard. This issue is probably
best resolved through judicial interpretation, not in the text itself.
(b) The right to choose one’s occupation. A provision of this
general sort can be found in the German Constitution. It overlaps a
good deal with protection of free entry into trades, and has similar
virtues. It also raises a similar interpretive difficulty, involving the
legitimacy of provisions designed to ensure that people are genuinely
qualified for jobs.
(c) A prohibition on forced labor. This provision seems indispensable to the emerging Eastern European democracies. It nicely complements the right to choose one’s occupation, by saying that government cannot require people to engage in work that it prefers
them to undertake. It also tends to guarantee free labor markets.
Such a provision also carries forward, in a particularly crisp way, the
traditional liberal prohibition on slavery, embodied in the general
idea that “we were not made for one another’s uses.“z9
6. Prohibition on government monopoZies (de jwe). If the goal is to
create a market economy, the Constitution should say that government may not give itself a legal monopoly over any sector of the
economy. A right of exclusive management of agriculture or
telecommunications is a sure way of stifling competition and of impairing economic productivity. Indeed, such a right will reintroduce
all of the problems discussed in Part I of this essay. The government
should be banned from embarking on this course.
Under certain narrow conditions, an exception might be permitted-as, for example, where government cannot efficiently perform
a certain function unless it creates a monopoly, and where competition is impossible. This is an extremely rare circumstance, however,
and a strong burden should be imposed on government to show that
it is present in any particular case.
It would probably be a mistake to create a constitutional prohibition on government monopolies that exist in fact but that are not
created through law. In the transition from communism, some de
29 J. Locke, Two Treatises on Government 311 (Laslett ed. 1960).
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facto monopolies are likely, and it is hard to see how a constitutional
court can prevent them. Here we encounter one of the limits of
constitutionalism: the narrow remedial power of the judiciary.
7. Nondiscrimination against private enterarises. It probably follows from what has been said thus far that government should be
constrained from imposing special disabilities on private enterprises,
that is, from taxing, regulating, or otherwise discouraging private
entities from operating on equal terms with official organs. Government might well seek to create such disabilities as a way of insulating itself from competition or of protecting its own instrumentalities. If it does so, it will create severe harms to civil society and to
economic markets. A prohibition could accomplish considerable
good
of course there will be some hard interpretive questions here. To
see whether there is discrimination, one will have to explore
whether private and public enterprises are similarly situated. This
will not always be an easy question to answer.
8. The right to travel within the nation and to andporn the nation. Protection of the right to travel serves both economic and

democratic functions. Especially in a system with some degree of
jurisdictional decentralization, the right to travel is a safeguard
against oppressive regulation. If citizens can leave, there is a powerful
deterrent to such regulation; people are able to “vote with their feet.”
It is fully plausible to think that in the United States, the right to
travel has-been one of the greatest safeguards against legislation
harmful to economic development. The right to-travel internally
creates a built-in check on tyranny, at least in a federal system. The
right to leave one’s nation serves the same function. In this sense the
right is simultaneously an economic and a political one.
9. Tbefiscal constittition. It might be appropriate to introduce a
series of provisions amounting to a “fiscal constitution,” that is, a
document designed to regulate institutions dealing with the relationship between government and the economy. Of course such
provisions would overlap with those discussed above. I offer a few
examples here. I do not discuss monetary arrangements and institutions, because they would call for lengthy discussion; but certainly
provisions bearing on that issue warrant consideration.
(a) Ban on tarz@ and duties. It has probably been established,
through both theory and practice, that tariffs and duties are on bal-
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ante harmful to the citizens of a nation. Despite this fact, there is
constant pressure for these measures, from the usually narrow groups
and interests that would benefit from them. Because tariffs and duties would create aggregate harms but short-term and narrow gains,
it might be sensible to enact, in advance, a constitutional prohibition
on them. The problem with this strategy is that it is at least reasonable to think that tariffs and duties are necessary under some conditions, and perhaps their availability is an important device for government to have while it is negotiating with other nations.
(b) Balanced budget. In the United States, there has recently
been some interest in a constitutional amendment that would require “balanced budgets. ” The case for such an amendment is not
obscure. For legislators or governments with short-term electoral
and domestic problems, it may well make sense to spend more than
one receives. The dangers of such a course are felt by future generations. A constitutional provision might be directed against this form
of myopia.
On reflection, however, it would probably be a mistake to include such a provision in a Constitution. A decision not to balance
the budget might be the right one in any particular year. The consequences of unbalanced budgets are sharply disputed among
economists. It is hardly clear that they are seriously harmful. Moreover, a provision to this effect would not readily be subject to judicial
enforcement.
(c) Restrictions on the taxing power. A fiscal constitution might
also impose restrictions on the power of taxation. Most plausible
here would be a ban on retroactive taxation. If government may tax
resources accumulated in a period in which they could not be taxed,
it should not, consistent with the rule of law, be permitted to introduce a tax that will be imposed retroactively. There are also questions here about possible restrictions on progressivity.
(d) Ban on controls on export or import of currency. It might well
make sense to accompany a right to travel with a prohibition on legal controls on the export or import of currency. Such a prohibition
could serve similar functions in guarding against protectionism.
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III. PROBLEMS
I have not dealt with two problems of special importance to the
emerging Eastern European democracies. The first is that the interpretation of constitutional provisions is of critical importance, and
interpretation cannot be entirely constrained by those who write the
Constitution. I have argued, for example, that a constitution should
ensure that private property cannot be taken without just compensation. But a constitution cannot possibly spell out, in advance, what
government action must be in order to qualify as a “taking.” Because
of the limitations of language, that task must be left to judges dealing with particular cases and particular measures. The same point
applies to all provisions now under consideration in Poland and
elsewhere. Constitutions set out the broad outlines for decision, but
in light of the limitations of words and human foresight, they cannot do much more than that.
More fundamentally, the meaning of any text is a function of
interpretive principles. To say that the original understanding is
binding, or that there should be an interpretive presumption in favor
of property rights, or that courts should minimally intrude into
political processes, or that a commitment to constitutional equality is
a commitment to the elimination of castes-all these are fully
understandable claims, but their contents are not “in” any text, and
they must be justified in substantive terms. Frequently, debates over
interpretive principles purport to be semantic; actually they involve
the selection, on political and moral grounds, of norms with which
to give meaning to constitutional texts. No document can avoid the
grant of discretion to interpreters in choosing among various possible norms.
The second problem is that a system of private property has to be
created rather than merely recognized. In light of the current experience of Eastern Europe, the notion of “laissez-faire,” as a description of markets, stands exposed as the conspicuous fiction that it is.
Markets depend for their existence not on passivity, but on active
governmental choices. Most of those choices cannot be made in a
Constitution. The movement for privatization-for the creation of
property rights- i s exceptionally important, and it must accompany
the writing and implementation of constitutional rights. The
Constitution will work against the backdrop of property rights, and
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it will protect those rights once created; but the act of creation will
not occur at the constitutional level.
In Eastern Europe, the problem is especially formidable. It is sad
but true that existing ownership rights often have their source in
arbitrariness or in injustice. Who owns what is a function of past
acts, public and private, many of which are irrelevant or unacceptable
from the moral point of view. In the West, this fact can be conveniently ignored, because the role of fate, injustice, force, or the state
in initial allocations is not really visible. And in important respects
this is all to the good; a constant focus on the origins of property
rights might make it hard to proceed, day to day, with existing allocations. In Eastern Europe, by contrast, any allocation will be very
visible indeed. It will occur all at once or in various steps, but in any
case people will see that some people are getting property through
government decree, and others are not. The task of allocation is for
this reason much more difficult.
Sometimes it is thought that the allocation of initial entitlements “does not matter,” in the sense that at least in the absence of
transactions costs, people will bargain their way toward the same
outcome regardless of that allocation. This basic idea is the fundamental claim behind the Coase theorem.30 Although the Coase
theorem has been highly influential in American law, and has contributed to many major advances in our understanding, the proposition is sometimes false. Its falsehood relates in important ways to
current reform efforts in Eastern Europe.
The central point here is that whether people have a preference
for a commodity, a right, or anything else is in part of function of
whether the government has allocated it to them in the first instance. There is simply no way to avoid the task of initially allocating
an entitlement, and the decision to grant an entitlement to one
person frequently makes that person value that entitlement more
than he would if the right had been allocated to someone else. (It
also makes other people value it less than they otherwise would.)
The initial allocation serves to influence, to legitimate, and to reinforce social understandings about presumptive rights of ownership.
That allocation has an important causal connection to individual
perceptions about the good or right in question.
3o See Coase, supra note 6.
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The point is simply a factual one, and it has received considerable
empirical confirmation. The effect on preferences of the initial allocation of a commodity or an entitlement is commonly described as
the “endowment effect.“31 The endowment effect has immense
importance. It suggests that any initial allocation of an entitlement-and government cannot refuse to make an initial allocation-may well have effects on preferences.
Economists and psychologists have found this effect in many
places, including both real exchange experiments and surveys. For
example, a recent study showed that people who were allocated certain consumption objects-pens, coffee mugs, and binocularsplaced a much higher valuation on those objects than did those who
were required to purchase them. 32 No such effects were observed for
money tokens in otherwise identical experiments. In a similar study,
some participants were given a mug and others a chocolate bar; both
were told that they could exchange one for the other. Participants in
a third group, not given a prior entitlement, were told that they
could select one or the other; 56% of these selected the candy bar. By
contrast, 89% of those initially given the mug refused to trade it for
the candy bar, and only 10% of those initially given the candy were
33
willing to trade it for the mug. The different evaluations could not
be explained by reference to anything other than the initial
endowment.
Studies based on survey research have made similar findings. One
such study found differences between payment and compensation
valuations of trees in a park of about five to one.34 When hunters
were questioned about the potential destruction of a duck habitat,
31 It was first so-called in Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer
Choice, 1 J. Econ. Behavior and Org. 39 (1980).
32 Kahneman, Knetch, and Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment
Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325 (1990). See also Knetch,
The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79
Am. Econ. Rev. ,1277 (1989); Knetch and Sinden, Willingness to Pay and
Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity
in Measures of Value, 99 Q J. Econ. 507 (1984).
33 Knetch, supra note 32.
34 Brookshire and Coursey, Measuring the Value of a Public Good: An
Empirical Comparison of Elictation Procedures, 77 Am. Econ. Rev. 554
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they said that they would be willing to pay an average of $247 to
prevent the loss-but would demand no less than $1044 to accept
it 35 In another study, participants required payments to accept
degradation of visibility ranging from 5 to more than 16 times
higher than their valuations based on their willingness to pay.36
According to yet another study, the compensation demanded for accepting a new risk of immediate death of .OOl% was one or two orders of magnitude higher than the amount of willingness to pay to
eliminate an existing risk of the same size.37 A related survey showed
similarly large status quo biases in willingness to pay for changes in
risks? A powerful status quo bias appears to affect reactions to risks
or losses.
In many settings, then, it has been shown that people place a
higher value on rights or goods that they currently hold than they
place on the same goods when in the hands of others. There are
multiple possible explanations for endowment effects. In many
cases, endowment effects reflect a genuine preference-shaping consequence from the initial assignment.39 Endowment effects may
35 J. Hammock and G. Brown, Waterfowl and Wetlands: Toward Bioeconomic Analysis (1974).
36 Rowe, d’Arge, and Brookshire, An Experiment on the Economic Value
of Visibility, 7 J. E nv. EC. and Management 1 (1980).
37 Thaler supra note 31, at 44.
38 Thus’people were willing to pay $3.78 on average to decrease the risk
from an insecticide, but 77% refused to buy the product at any price, however
reduced, if the risk level would increase by an equivalent amount. Viscusi, Magat, and Huber, An Investigation of the Rationality of Consumer Valuations
of Multiple Health Risks, ‘18 RAND Journal of Economics 465 (1987).
39 Such effects may also come from experience; people who use a product or
have an entitlement may learn to appreciate its value. They may be a product of
strategic considerations; someone may be unwilling to give up a right because
the concession would reveal weakness in bargaining. Sometimes they might be
produced by the wealth effect of the initial allocation of the entitlement. Different allocations produce differences in wealth-someone with more entitlements
is to that extent richer-and perhaps some allocations have wealth effects sufficiently large to affect the point to which people will bargain.
Such effects might also derive from anticipated after-the-fact regret. People
who trade one good for another may think that in the event of disappointment,
they will be left not only with a good of uncertain value, but also with a feeling
of responsibility for that very fact. Notably, some of these explanations do not
depend on real preference change at all. They account for endowment effects
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reflect an effort to reduce cognitive dissonance: High valuation of
what one owns, and low valuation or what one does not, is a means
of reducing dissonance, and in some respects it is highly adaptive.
Perhaps, too, the initial allocation has an important legitimating
effect, suggesting that the entitlement “naturally” belongs where it
has been placed, and putting a social burden on even voluntary
changes. In some cases the divergence between willingness to pay
and willingness to accept is probably a product of the change in social norms brought about by the change in the allocation of the
entitlement.40
For present purposes, it is not necessary to explain the mechanism behind endowment effects. It is enough to say that the initial
allocation has preference-shaping effects and that when this is so,
there is no acontextual “preference” with which to do legal or political work.
If all this is correct, large consequences follow. In Eastern Europe, property rights have often yet to be allocated. A series of decis i o n s -not feasibly placed in the Constitution-must be made to
establish who owns what. The distinguishing feature of a system of
freedom of contract is that rights of ownership are alienable. But
such a system can operate with quite different initial allocations of
rights. Should workers have a presumptive right to be fired only for
cause, a right that employers can “buy” through contract? Or should
employers have a presumptive right to fire employees at will, a right
that employees can purchase in an agreement? Does the right to
own a plant include the right to pollute, subject to an agreement to
cease, obtained by neighbors? Or do the neighbors own that right
initially, with a provision for purchase from the plant owner? A
regime of freedom of contract is consistent with all of these systems.
The key point is that the initial allocation will affect the valuation of
the rights by both current owners and would-be purchasers. And if
while holding preferences constant. But these sorts of explanations do not appear sufficient.
4o The endowment effect should probably not be seen as a case of individual irrationality, as has been found in certain reactions to low-probability
events or in certain kinds of preference-reversals. It is by no means clear that
status quo bias of this kind is irrational.
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it does so, the initial allocation will have important consequences for
ultimate outcomes.
For transition in Eastern Europe, it is important also to understand that much of governmental behavior-the acts of government
and of those who seek to influence it-might well be a product of
endowment effects. The point has a range of positive implications;
indeed, it helps to explain a wide range of political outcomes and
political behavior. Political participants should be able to exploit endowment effects by attempting to describe the status quo in a way
that takes advantage of the phenomenon of status quo bias. So too,
political actors are frequently successful when they are able to identify and control the perception of the status quo. One exampleprominent in Eastern Europe before and after communism-is
provided by constant political efforts to lower expectations by describing the status quo, or the expected status quo, as systematically
worse than in fact it is-so that the citizenry will rarely perceive deviations as losses but instead only as gains. The phenomenon occurs
during elections, during wars, and during debate over the economy.
With respect to current dilemmas in Eastern Europe, the existence of endowment effects shows the importance of initial entitlements in creating preferences and beliefs: Probably the most that
can be said is that the initial allocation should be undertaken democratically and with a firm awareness of the (perhaps surprising)
consequences. But the Constitution cannot plausibly make that
allocation. It can only protect property rights once they have been
created. Like the problem of interpretation, the problem of allocating initial entitlements points to important limits in constitutionalism.
CONCLUSION
The three transitions now taking place in Eastern Europe
should be brought more closely together. Above all, the task of
constitution-making can help facilitate the transitions to economic
markets and to democratic self-government. To this end, I have
outlined some possible constitutional provisions designed to protect
the basic institutions of private property, free markets: and civil society. A similar analysis might be applied to provisions not directly
concerned with the protection of markets-including rights to as-
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sociational liberty; freedom from discrimination on the basis of sex,
race, religion, and ethnicity; and rights of political and religious
liberty.
The most general point is that with strong constitutional protection of private property and economic markets, nations in Eastern Europe can take an important step on the way to both economic growth and democratic self-government. The connection
between private property and prosperity is well understood; the experience of Eastern Europe confirms a less obvious point, involving
the contributions of such rights to the security indispensable to citizenship. In this light such rights can be defended not on the ground
that they conform to “human nature,” but on the contrary as part of
a system having salutary rather than destructive effects on human
character. Both markets and democracy are most plausibly defended
in these terms.
To say this is hardly to challenge programs that redistribute resources, training, or opportunities to the poor, or that otherwise
protect the vulnerable. The instrumental arguments that justify private property call for efforts to ensure that everyone can have some
of it. These arguments powerfully support government programs
supplementing market arrangements.41
Without strong constitutional provisions on behalf of property
rights, civil society; and markets, there will probably be a substantial
temptation to intrude on all of these institutions, and, by so doing,
to recreate the very problems that such institutions are supposed to
solve. In Eastern Europe, the task of constitution-making is more
difficult, and far more pressing, than it was in the West, in which a
well-established backdrop of rights and institutions was already in
place. The ironic conclusion is that the case for a firm negative
constitution, and for creation and protection of property rights and
free markets, is very strong in Eastern Europe; and this is so even if
the corresponding case is, in Western countries, somewhat ambiguous.
41 To say this is not, however, to say that such programs should be guaranteed constitutionally. Nor is it to deny that diffkult instrumental judgments
must be made about the efficacy of different programs, some of which undoubtedly undermine their own goals by creating dependency.
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No constitution can make the initial allocations of property
rights; this must be left to democratic processes. Moreover, no constitutional text can control the process of interpretation, and thus
there is always a risk that written documents will be given a meaning other than that which would promote a nation’s welfare. But
large-scale social change is always accompanied by risks, and the
ubiquity of risk provides no reason for resignation or discouragement. A constitution offering firm protection to property rights
could do a great deal to ease the transition to markets and democracy.
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